

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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DISPATCH NO.: KAPOK B-251

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 25 August 1948

TO : Chief, FBM

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, Germany *c/fels*

SUBJECT: GENERAL — Operational

SPECIFIC — Means of communications under PASTIME planning in Berlin

Reference: KAPOK B-250, B-252

1. In order to implement the program outlined in KAPOK B-250, certain technical aids will have to be provided both from Washington and Karlsruhe, to solve the manifold communications problems facing us and to provide couriers, agents, cutouts, letter drops, et al., with the necessary means of accomplishing their job with the maximum security. The main props needed are as follows:

a. Secret inks:

To date we have been supplied by Karlsruhe and Washington with several low security inks, which are easy enough to produce and apply, but which in the long run are of such low security that they could really only be used by the agents in correspondence with each other, rather than by head agents for transmission of intelligence to the outside. The time has come, in my opinion, to risk some of the fruits of years of experimenting in Washington, and to send them to the field to be used operationally. Special emphasis in this connection is put on medium security inks and pencils, the application of which would not require too technical a knowledge of chemistry, and would not involve painstaking work for the agent.

A good example of what we mean is the low security (popularly called laxative) ink provided us by Washington in the past. Whereas the ink was definitely of use to protect agent communications, its application was a laborious job, and

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DOCUMENT NO.

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AUTH: DR 2011

DATE: 27 MAY 2011

Wash-CIA-Pro-712

it was impossible for the agent to write lengthy reports using this method. Finally, on the initiative of an officer in the Communications Intelligence Service in Frankfurt, the ink was made up in a pencil and the formula finally could be practically applied to actual field operations.

It is our intention to give chains working through one channel both a low security ink, for communications between the head agent and his sub-agents, and a higher security ink for communications between the agent and the home base. This latter ink would have a developer unknown to the agent in the field, so that the chances of compromise of that particular ink would be slight. On the other hand means must be provided for communications from the home base to the agent in the field, in which case a developer must be furnished to the agent, without divulging to him the composition of the original ink.

Unfortunately most of our correspondence with Washington on the subject of secret inks has been more in general terms, and has not provided us with the necessary operational details to be able to apply for any specific ink, since we are not in the know on the technical difficulties involved in specific methods. Agents differ in their educational background, privacy of residence, and their particular reporting differs in length and format. These are all considerations which cannot be overlooked. Since this particular letter is intended to ask not only for advice but for specific shipments of ink and other devices, we will send under separate cover (KAPOK B-252) the names of agents, their type of reporting and the technical method in which their reports could be transmitted.

b. Cameras, special photographic methods.

This question should be treated in conjunction with a. above. Certainly some agents are better served by photographic methods of reporting, and some by secret inks. This will also be covered in a separate memo outlining the specific problems. Meanwhile we should like to be informed on the progress made in such long promised devices as: Microdot equipment, portable gaseous discharge tube for microfilming, and a miniature camera for microfile or general photographic purposes, without the failings of the Matchbox or Minox, since they both have proved totally unsatisfactory for photographing documents under field conditions. Such devices as the "latent image" photographic method is thought impractical for this area, although a relaxation of general censorship hereabouts might make this somewhat more

interesting. Unfortunately, however, spy stories are too popular over here, and there is hardly one which does not describe this method.

Besides these specific requests for information and help in the special photographic equipment field, we would definitely need some twenty Leicas or Contax cameras, which could however be bought in the field, if we have your approval for the purchase. Their price on the black market in Berlin at present runs around \$40 to \$50 in American commodities.

c. Concealment devices.

We shall need numerous concealment devices as operational props for the different agents we leave behind under the PASTIME program. We would like to know if any new additions have been made to your stocks since 1946. Our heaviest requests are for suitcases, pocket books, bricks, and if possible for some horrible ornaments, such as plaster or bronze statuettes, which are a great favorite in German homes. (Goethe, Schiller, Bismarck, and Beethoven rank high.) We could furnish you in each case with one or several examples of the "untreated" product; should you desire them, please send us a cable request, so you will not be delayed in working out the concealment devices. We are in need of at least thirty of these devices for PASTIME, with as much variety in the end product as possible. We should also greatly appreciate some idea of your latest developments, since I am sure that we are in the market for some of them.

d. Codes.

Although letter codes are largely scoffed at, in many instances at present we are approached by agents to provide some idea for a simple code for their subagents, who would like to report some things by mail. We know that the code, such as can be applied in censorable communications, will never be fit for general use; but especially for emergencies, or for communications out of a restricted area, a letter code would have a larger chance of success than some of our secret inks. We therefore would like some concrete suggestions in the field of codes, which could be given to agents at our discretion. (Double transposition would also not be out of place, so long as you refresh the old timers' memory with a full and detailed description.)

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e. Special radio equipment.

I believe that more can be accomplished in the line of radio than Operation WRINKLE now provides. The whole developments during the latter part of the war in the direction of J&E must certainly have been followed up, and if any equipment in that line would be of possible use to us with our specific problems, then it should be brought to our attention.

I do not want to leave out of this paragraph the hope of the field that the STR 1 will be improved. We have heard rumors of new developments in this matter, and hope that we shall not continue to receive old equipment, if new equipment is ready for use in Washington. In this line we re-emphasize the importance of providing the improved or supermodern STR 1(?) with some means of camouflage, such as the exterior of a table radio (which also plays), and definitely without the detailed explanations in English. German is what we need.

2. I realize that we are throwing rather a lot at you in this whole field, but cannot emphasize enough that the planning and eventual operation of PASTIME will largely depend on the operational props we can get to aid our agents.

[ ]  
FR, Berlin Operations Base

ASM:ljp

Dist:  
2-FBM  
2-COS  
3-File